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1. Introduction 
Scholars of global governance are increasingly interested in transnational 
commercial arbitration—the binding resolution of transnational commercial 
disputes by private third-party decision makers.1  The emerging interdisciplinary 
scholarship on the transnational commercial arbitration system has the potential to 
make important contributions to our understanding of global governance.  The 
system offers dispute resolution services that are widely used by transnational 
actors, and it provides a process for the interpretation and enforcement of 
contracts, which are the backbone of transnational commerce.  By understanding 
arbitration, scholars can better understand the governance of transnational 
commerce. 
The study of transnational commercial arbitration also can shed new light 
on the role of private actors in global governance, thus contributing to the 
continuing efforts of scholars of international relations to move beyond traditional 
state-focused analysis.2  Two questions have traditionally been at the core of 
social science scholarship on governance: Harold Lasswell’s “who gets what” 
question3 and Robert Dahl’s “who governs” question.4  Transnational commercial 
arbitration involves private third parties (arbitrators) answering the “who gets 
what” question in disputes between transnational commercial actors.  It is 
therefore natural to think of transnational commercial arbitration as a system of 
global governance in which private actors are the “governors.”5  Various scholars 
have therefore characterized transnational commercial arbitration as a form of 
private global governance.6 
In this article, I use a combination of empirical and legal analysis to draw 
attention to the critical role of the state in the transnational commercial arbitration 
system, and I show that both rule-making and enforcement in the system depend 
largely on interactions between private and public actors.  Conceptually, 
arbitration does not fit neatly into established categories of “private” or “public” 
governance.  By treating arbitration as a form of private governance, scholars run 
the risk of obscuring the role of the state and its interactions with private actors, 
                                                 
1 E.g. Cutler 1995, 2001, 2003; Gal-Or 2008; Mattli 2001; Stone Sweet 2002, 2006. 
2 E.g. Büthe 2004; Cutler et al 1999; Graz & Nölke 2008; Hall & Biersteker 2002. 
3 Lasswell 1936; Caporaso et al 2008, 406. 
4 Dahl 1961. 
5 On the concept of “global governors,” see Avant et al (2010). 
6 E.g. Gal-Or 2008, 219 (discussing arbitration as part of the “formal institutionalization of 
transnational private governance”); Mattli 2001, 919 (discussing transnational commercial 
arbitration as a “private international institutional arrangement”); Stone Sweet 2006, 628 
(discussing transnational commercial arbitration as part of “a private system of governance for 
transnational business”); Whytock 2008a, 457 (describing transnational arbitration as part of 
“transnational private governance”). 
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thus hindering their understanding of how transnational economic activity is 
governed.  I therefore argue for a modest reorientation of global governance 
scholarship on the transnational commercial arbitration system, according to 
which scholars would conceptualize the system as a mixed private-public form of 
governance and place more emphasis on understanding private-public interaction 
in the system.  A broader implication of the article’s analysis is that understanding 
private-public interaction is a key to understanding global governance in general.7 
Part 2 provides an overview of transnational commercial arbitration as a 
system of global governance.  Any system of governance must provide for the 
setting of rules and their enforcement.8  The remainder of the paper thus analyzes 
several different types of data to shed empirical light on who makes the rules in 
the transnational commercial arbitration system, and who enforces them.  Part 3 
shows how private and public actors together make not only the rules governing 
the overall system, but also the procedural and substantive rules governing 
particular arbitral proceedings.  Next, Part 4 shows how both private and public 
actors help mitigate enforcement problems in the transnational commercial 
arbitration system.  These problems include enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate, as well as enforcement of arbitrators’ decisions.  Throughout the article, 
I complement the empirical analysis with insights from legal scholarship that 
recognizes the system’s hybrid nature, scholarship which may be useful for 
scholars of global governance interested in transnational commercial arbitration.9  
I conclude by drawing out some of the broader implications of the analysis. 
2. Transnational Commercial Arbitration and Global Governance 
2.1 An Overview of the Transnational Commercial Arbitration System 
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution whereby two or more parties 
(“disputants”) submit their dispute to a third-party decision maker (the 
“arbitrator”).  The party initiating arbitration is the “claimant,” and the other party 
is the “respondent.”  Arbitration has four defining characteristics.  First, the 
arbitrator is a private actor selected by the disputants themselves, or in accordance 
with a procedure agreed in advance by the disputants.  Often, there are several 
arbitrators.  Second, arbitration is consensual.  An arbitrator cannot resolve a 
dispute unless the disputants have agreed to have the arbitrator resolve that 
                                                 
7 Similarly, Bartley argues that “scholars of private regulation should abandon the image of global 
standards bypassing the state and transcending old configurations of power and instead attend to 
the fascinating ways in which standards are filtered, renegotiated, or compromised as they enter 
particular political economies” (2010, 38). 
8 Kjaer 2004, 10. 
9 For an especially useful entry point to this legal scholarship, see Drahozal 2009. 
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dispute.10  Third, in arbitration, the disputants are for the most part free to choose 
the procedural and substantive rules governing the dispute resolution process.11  
Fourth, the arbitrator’s final decision—called an “award”—is binding on the 
disputants.  When the claimant prevails, the award typically takes the form of an 
order that the respondent (now the “award debtor”) pay a certain sum of money to 
the claimant (now the “award creditor”). 
A comparison with two leading alternatives to arbitration—mediation and 
litigation—helps clarify these four characteristics.  First, like arbitration, 
mediation and litigation involve third parties.  Like an arbitrator, a mediator is a 
private actor.  In contrast, the third party in litigation is a state actor (a judge).  
Second, like arbitration, mediation is consensual.  Litigation, however, is non-
consensual: once one disputant (the plaintiff) initiates the litigation process, the 
other disputant (the defendant) may be bound by the judge’s decision even 
without its consent.  Third, in contrast to arbitration and mediation processes, 
which are generally governed by rules agreed upon by the disputants, state law 
determines the rules governing litigation procedures.12  Fourth, whereas 
arbitrators’ and judges’ decisions are legally binding, mediators do not make 
binding decisions. 
Transnational commercial arbitration involves the arbitration of disputes 
arising out of commercial activity having connections to more than one state.  
These connections may be territorial, when the activity or its effects touch the 
territory of more than one state; or they may be based on legal relationships 
between a state and the actors engaged in or affected by that activity, such as 
citizenship.13  Investor-state arbitration—the arbitration of disputes between a 
state and a foreign investor in that state—is generally treated as a distinct form of 
transnational arbitration, and is not discussed in this article. 
There are two basic types of transnational commercial arbitration: 
“institutional” and “ad hoc.”  In institutional arbitration, the disputants select an 
existing private arbitral institution to administer the arbitration process.  Along 
                                                 
10 Under some circumstances, an arbitration agreement between two or more parties may also be 
binding on other parties based on legal theories such as agency and the “group of companies” 
doctrine.  Blackaby and Partasides 2009, 99-105; Born 2009, 1142.  In general, once arbitration 
has begun, a party does not have a right to stop the proceedings unilaterally.  If a party fails to 
participate in the proceedings, it runs the risk of a default award being entered against it.  
Blackaby and Partasides 2009, 524. 
11 This freedom is subject to mandatory provisions of law.  See Born 2009, 1765. 
12 I use the term “state” to refer a nation-state, not a territorial subunit thereof such as a “state” of 
the United States. 
13 I use the adjective “transnational” instead of “international” because the latter technically refers 
only to states and their relations with each other, and does not include private actors.  Nye & 
Keohane 1971, 330-332.  Thus, by transnational activity, I mean activity engaged in by state 
and/or non-state actors having legal or territorial connections to more than one state. 
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with that selection, the disputants often select the procedural rules developed by 
that institution.  Among the leading transnational arbitral institutions are the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) 
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).14  In ad hoc arbitration, the 
parties do not select an arbitral institution to administer the arbitration process, 
and instead make their own administrative arrangements. 
As noted above, arbitration depends on the disputants’ consent.  This 
consent can be given either before or after a dispute arises.  Many transnational 
contracts include ex ante arbitration clauses.  A typical example of such a clause 
is the one suggested by the ICC: “All disputes arising out of or in connection with 
the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in 
accordance with the said Rules.”  Disputants may also agree after a dispute arises 
to submit that dispute to arbitration.  However, once a dispute has arisen, 
litigation will often offer significant advantages to at least one of the disputants, 
making ex post agreements to arbitrate difficult to reach.  For this reason, while 
transnational commercial arbitration is a common method for resolving disputes 
related to contractual relationships, it is likely to be relatively rare in disputes 
between parties who are not in preexisting contractual relationships.15 
2.2 The Role of Arbitration in the Governance of Transnational Commerce 
The transnational commercial arbitration system performs several closely related 
functions in the governance of transnational commerce.  First, by offering a 
mechanism for third-party interpretation and enforcement of contracts, it provides 
a means by which transnational actors can enhance the credibility of their 
commitments to each other.16  Second, by providing a process for filling gaps in 
contracts, arbitration can mitigate the incomplete contracting problems routinely 
faced by transnational commercial actors.17  Third, the transnational commercial 
arbitration system offers dispute resolution services that can help transnational 
actors manage the costs of conflict in commercial relationships.18 
                                                 
14 A list of all the acronyms used in this article can be found in the appendix. 
15 Born 2006, 37; Moses 2008, 17. 
16 On the importance of third-party enforcement for credible commitments and, hence, for 
contracting, see North 1993.  See also Stone Sweet 2002, 324-326. 
17 Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 536f. 
18 Ashenfelter 1998, 88. 
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Alternatively, these functions may be performed by domestic courts.19  
However, arbitration is widely understood to have a number of advantages over 
litigation as a method of transnational commercial dispute resolution.  Arbitration 
may offer a more neutral alternative to litigation in a court of a disputant’s home 
country.  Whereas state-made rules govern the litigation process, arbitration is a 
flexible process that the disputants themselves can tailor to their needs.  While 
litigation ordinarily is public, the disputants can agree to keep arbitral proceedings 
confidential.  Perhaps most importantly from the perspective of disputants, it is 
generally easier to enforce an arbitral award issued in one country against the 
assets of an award debtor in another country than it is to do so with a judgment of 
a court.20 
But arbitration is not without its disadvantages.  Although it was once 
considered a speedier and less expensive method of transnational commercial 
dispute resolution, this perception may be eroding.21  Moreover, there generally is 
no right to appeal an arbitrator’s decision.  Another disadvantage is that 
arbitrators lack the coercive power of the state that courts can use to compel 
disputants and third parties to produce information relevant to the dispute.  
However, arbitrators may draw adverse inferences from a disputant’s refusal to 
make available relevant information, and in some countries (including the United 
States) judicial enforcement of arbitral orders to produce evidence is available.22  
Finally, because of its consensual nature, arbitration ordinarily cannot be imposed 
on a person who is not a party to the arbitration agreement.23   
2.3 The Empirical Importance of Transnational Commercial Arbitration 
Ex ante arbitration clauses are common in transnational commercial contracts.  
However, their frequency is difficult to estimate.  One observer claims that more 
than ninety percent of all transnational commercial contracts contain an 
arbitration clause,24 while another argues that the actual frequency of arbitration 
clauses is substantially lower.25  According to a recent empirical analysis, only 
twenty percent of the transnational contracts of U.S. public companies filed with 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contain arbitration 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of the role of domestic courts in global governance, see Whytock 2009.  For a 
discussion of the factors influencing transnational actors’ selection of arbitration versus litigation 
from the perspective of rational institutional design theory, see Mattli 2001. 
20 Born 2009, 78. 
21 McIlwrath & Schroeder 2008. 
22 Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 318f; Born 2009, 1919-1929.  
23 Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 39, 99-106. 
24 Berger 1999, 111. 
25 Born 2009, 71. 
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clauses.26  However, this analysis has been criticized as suffering from selection 
bias because contracts filed with the SEC may often be precisely the sorts of 
contracts for which arbitration is least appropriate.27 
Even if the frequency of arbitration clauses is difficult to estimate, dispute 
resolution trends suggest that transnational commercial arbitration is increasingly 
widespread, as shown in Figure 1.  The annual rate of filings with the world’s 
major international arbitral institutions has increased steadily from 1,148 in 1992 
to more than 3,700 in 2008.28  Similar data is not available for ad hoc arbitration.  
While some observers speculate that ad hoc arbitrations are few compared to 
institutional arbitrations, others suggest that institutional and ad hoc arbitration 
rates are similar, and still others conjecture that ad hoc transnational arbitrations 
may in fact outnumber institutional transnational arbitrations.29 
One benchmark for assessing transnational commercial arbitration trends 
in the leading arbitral institutions is to compare them to transnational contract 
litigation trends in the U.S. federal district courts.  To estimate transnational 
contract litigation trends, I analyzed data collected by the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts on civil lawsuits filed each year in the district courts.30  
                                                 
26 Eisenberg & Miller 2007, 350-352. 
27 Drahozal & Ware 2010, 460. 
28 HKIAC 2009.  The arbitral institutions included in this count are the AAA, the ICC, and the 
LCIA, as well as the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), 
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), the Japan Commercial Arbitration 
Association (JCAA), the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB), the Kuala Lumpur 
Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA), the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), 
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and the British 
Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre (BCICAC). Because the data collected by 
the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre does not include ad hoc transnational commercial 
arbitration, and because data for some institutions include domestic as well as transnational 
arbitrations, these trends are an imperfect measure of overall transnational commercial arbitration 
rates. 
29 Drahozal & Naimark 2005, 7. 
30 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) data is part of the Federal Court 
Cases: Integrated Database Series, available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Science Research (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00072).  
Specifically, I analyzed contract claims over which the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. 
federal courts is based on the fact that the dispute is between a citizen of a U.S. state and a citizen 
of a foreign country (i.e., alienage jurisdiction), as contained in the AO’s annual civil terminations 
data.  To extract these cases from the data, I used the residence variable (which indicates the 
citizenship of the parties) and the nature of suit variable (which identifies the type of dispute being 
litigated, including contract disputes).  I excluded two types of claims categorized by the AO as 
“contract claims”—Miller Act claims and stockholder suits—since they are unlikely to be subject 
to transnational arbitration, and their inclusion would thus risk biasing the comparison in favor of 
litigation.  One disadvantage of the civil terminations data is that the record for a case (including 
its filing date) does not appear in that data until the case has terminated (that is, until proceedings 
have come to an end due to settlement, judgment, or otherwise).  Cases filed in earlier years but 
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Of course, transnational contract litigation in the U.S. federal district courts is just 
part of overall transnational commercial litigation worldwide.  However, similar 
data is not available for transnational commercial litigation in U.S. state courts 





Filings in U.S. Courts and Major Arbitral Institutions 
 
Using this benchmark, Figure 1 shows that, as transnational commercial 
arbitration filings in the world’s leading arbitral institutions have been increasing, 
transnational contract litigation filings in the U.S. federal district courts have been 
decreasing.  In 1994, the total number of arbitration filings in the world’s leading 
arbitral institutions surpassed the number of transnational contract litigation 
filings in the U.S. federal district courts for the first time; and by 2006 the former 
                                                                                                                                     
which have not yet terminated will be missing from the data.  Because lawsuits often last multiple 
years, this lag is likely to be particularly significant in the more recent years for which data is 
available.  Therefore, to mitigate bias in favor of arbitration, I present results only through 2006.  
For more details on this data, see Whytock (2008b).  However, because Whytock (2008b) 
analyzes terminations of claims while this article analyzes filings, the exact results differ. 
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was substantially higher than the latter.  As of 2006, the annual number of 
transnational commercial arbitration filings in each of the two most prominent 
arbitral institutions—the AAA and the ICC—was still individually lower than the 
annual number of transnational contract litigation filings in the U.S. federal 
district courts.  However, if current trends continue, the AAA and the ICC each 
will soon be resolving more transnational commercial disputes than the U.S. 
federal district courts.31 
In summary, transnational commercial arbitration is an increasingly 
widespread form of global governance.  The upward trend in the number of 
disputes filed in the world’s leading arbitral institutions is particularly striking 
when compared to the downward trend in transnational contract disputes filed in 
the U.S. federal district courts. 
3. Rule-Making in Transnational Commercial Arbitration 
The rules of the transnational commercial arbitration system include rules 
governing the system as such—for example, rules regarding the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards—as well as procedural and substantive 
rules governing particular arbitral proceedings.  Who makes these rules?  Scholars 
have tended to treat the transnational commercial arbitration system as a private 
form of global governance.  However, through a combination of international 
treaties and domestic law, states—working closely with private organizations—
have played a fundamental role in making the rules governing the system.  These 
rules provide critical, if qualified, support for transnational commercial 
arbitration.  Private actors play a leading role in determining which rules govern 
particular arbitral proceedings—but here, too, the state plays an important role by 
supplying rules that private disputants frequently choose.  Private-public 
interactions thus pervade both dimensions of rulemaking. 
3.1 The Rules Governing the Transnational Commercial Arbitration System 
The most important transnational commercial arbitration treaty is the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (known as the New York Convention).32  Although made by states, the 
New York Convention is a product of private-public interaction.  The ICC—a 
nongovernmental organization—produced the first draft, which the United 
                                                 
31 The extent to which these trends are causally related is unclear; see Whytock 2008b, 48f. 
32 This paper does not discuss two other important transnational commercial arbitration treaties: 
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (known as the Panama 
Convention), and the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. 
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Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) then revised; and the 45 state 
participants at the United Nations Conference on Commercial Arbitration 
finalized the convention in 1958.33  As one arbitration expert puts it, the 
convention “provides what amounts to a universal constitutional charter for the 
international arbitral process, whose sweeping terms have enabled both national 
courts and arbitral tribunals to develop durable, effective means for enforcing 
international arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.”34  As another puts it, the 
convention “is the foundation on which the whole of the edifice of international 
arbitration rests.”35 
Article II of the New York Convention establishes a general rule that 
signatory states shall recognize written arbitration agreements “concerning a 
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”  It also requires the domestic 
courts of signatory states, at the request of a party to an arbitration agreement, to 
refer the parties to that agreement to arbitration “unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” 
Article III establishes a general rule that signatory states shall recognize 
and enforce arbitral awards.  Article V specifies a series of exceptions to this 
general rule, allowing refusal of enforcement “at the request of the party against 
whom it is invoked,” if that party proves to the competent authority where 
enforcement is sought that: 
 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to 
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which 
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of 
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which 
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made. 
 
                                                 
33 Born 2009, 93f. 
34 Born 2009, 92f. 
35 Kerr 1997, 127.  See also Reisman 1992. 
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Article V also allows refusal of enforcement “if the competent authority in the 
country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The subject 
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law 
of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country.” 
As one measure of the breadth of state support for these foundational rules 
of the transnational commercial arbitration system, I gathered data on the number 
of states that have become parties to the New York Convention over time.36  As 
Figure 2 shows, the number increased from nine in 1960, to fifty-five in 1980, to 
124 in 2000.  As of 2009, the New York Convention had entered into force in 144 
of the 192 members of the United Nations.  These results suggest broad and 
steadily increasing state support for the rules favoring enforcement of arbitration 





Cumulative Number of State Parties to New York Convention,  
by Year of Entry into Force 
                                                 
36 The source of my data is the table of signatories to the New York Convention maintained by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).  See 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (accessed 
December 15, 2009). 
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In addition, individual states have enacted domestic laws providing for domestic 
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.  For example, 
in the United States, Section 206 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) authorizes 
U.S. courts to order arbitration in accordance with an arbitration agreement 
covered by the New York Convention.37  Section 207 of the FAA requires U.S. 
courts to enforce an arbitral award covered by the New York Convention “unless 
it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of 
the award specified in the said Convention.”  In addition to the FAA, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has announced a variety of important rules governing the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards by U.S. courts, and is 
generally considered to have a strong pro-arbitration policy. 
Other states have also adopted domestic laws governing transnational 
commercial arbitration.  For example, some states have adopted domestic 
legislation based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which, 
among other things, provides for enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards.38  Although the Model Law was produced by an 
intergovernmental entity—UNCITRAL—it was developed in consultation with 
private experts and arbitral institutions, and is thus, like the New York 
Convention, a result of private-public interaction.39  The UN General Assembly 
has encouraged states to consider the Model Law, but there is no requirement that 
states adopt it—it is only a model upon which states may base domestic 
legislation.  Thus, its legal status depends on state legislative action. 
As another measure of the breadth of state support for the rules governing 
the transnational commercial arbitration system, I gathered data on the number of 
states that have enacted legislation based on the Model Law.40  As Figure 3 
                                                 
37 The full text of Section 206 is as follows: “A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may 
direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for, 
whether that place is within or without the United States. Such court may also appoint arbitrators 
in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.” 
38 Moses 2008, 64.  Under Article 8(1) of the Model Act, “A court before which an action is 
brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests not 
later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to 
arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.”  Article 35 states the general rule that arbitral awards shall be enforced, and Article 36 
specifies exceptions to enforcement.  The Model Law was amended in 2006.  Article 34 specifies 
the circumstances in which a court may set aside an arbitral award.   
39 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 2006, vii. 
40 The source of my data is UNCITRAL’s list of national legislation based on the Model Law.  See 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html 
(accessed December 15, 2009).  This count does not include nine U.S. states (California, 
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shows, the number has increased steadily from one in 1986, to thirty-five in 2000, 
to a total of sixty-one as of 2008.  This trend suggests increasingly widespread 





Cumulative Number of States  
with Domestic Legislation Based on UNCITRAL Model Law, by Year 
 
In summary, the basic rules governing the transnational commercial 
arbitration system—including the rules governing the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards—are a result of private-public interaction.  States 
have demonstrated broad support for those rules through increasingly widespread 
adoption of international and domestic legal instruments such as the New York 
Convention and legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
                                                                                                                                     
Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas), each of which have enacted legislation based 
on the Model Act. 
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3.2 The Rules Governing Particular Arbitrations 
While states have enacted rules providing foundations for the transnational 
commercial arbitration system, private actors play the leading role in specifying 
the rules governing particular arbitral proceedings.  These include both procedural 
rules, which specify how an arbitral proceeding should be conducted, and 
substantive rules, which are applied to the activity of the disputants that gave rise 
to the dispute. 
One of the defining features of transnational commercial arbitration is the 
ability of the disputants themselves to specify the applicable procedural rules, 
subject to any mandatory provisions of the law of the state in which the arbitration 
takes place.41  Procedural rules cover matters such as the number and selection of 
arbitrators, the place and language of the arbitral proceedings, the written 
submissions and oral arguments that the disputants are allowed to make, the 
presentation of evidence, and the testimony of witnesses.  In theory, disputants 
can create their own procedural rules from scratch.  In practice, however, they 
generally specify an existing set of procedural rules, adopting them either in their 
entirety or with modifications. 
The world’s leading private arbitral institutions have developed various 
sets of procedural rules.  When disputants opt for institutional arbitration, they 
typically will also opt for the procedural rules of the administering institution.  
For example, for arbitrations administered by the AAA’s International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the disputants will ordinarily select the ICDR’s own 
procedural rules.42  When the disputants select an arbitral institution’s procedural 
rules, those rules are private in a double sense: they were produced by a private 
institution rather than a state, and they are selected by agreement of the disputants 
rather than imposed by law. 
Even disputants who opt for ad hoc arbitration will not necessarily create 
their own procedural rules from scratch.  They, too, will often select an existing 
set of rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.43  UNCITRAL developed 
these rules in consultation with private arbitral institutions, and then formally 
adopted them.  The United Nations General Assembly then passed a resolution 
recommending their use and widespread distribution.44  These rules are thus a 
product of private-public interaction—namely, between an intergovernmental 
organization (UNCITRAL) and various private arbitral institutions. 
                                                 
41 Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 180. 
42 In fact, the ICDR’s model arbitration clause includes selection of its International Arbitration 
Rules.  See http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4945 (last accessed August 27, 2010). 
43 These rules, adopted by UNCITRAL on April 28, 1976, are available at  
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (last accessed August 
27, 2010). 
44 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/98, December 15, 1976. 
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Whereas procedural rules govern the arbitral process, substantive rules 
govern the activity of the disputants that gave rise to the dispute.  The arbitrator is 
expected to determine whether the respondent’s behavior violated the applicable 
substantive rules and, if so, to issue an award in favor of the claimant.45  
Disputants may specify the applicable substantive rules by including a choice-of-
law clause in their contracts.  Disputants may specify private rules, including 
transnational commercial customs, which are sometimes referred to as “lex 
mercatoria” or “transnational law.”  Or they may specify public rules, such as the 
national law of a particular state, or hybrid rules. 
Hybrid substantive rules include the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts.  UNIDROIT—the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law—is an intergovernmental organization that aims to 
facilitate global harmonization of commercial law.46  To develop its Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, UNIDROIT worked closely with private 
actors, including lawyers and legal scholars, with the goal of providing “a system 
of rules especially tailored to the needs of international commercial 
transactions.”47  Thus, like UNCITRAL’s procedural rules, the UNIDROIT 
Principles are a product of private-public interaction.  The UNIDROIT Principles 
are not legally binding, and they have not been adopted as state law.  However, 
disputants sometimes select them as a source of substantive rules. 
As one measure of the relative importance of public, private, and hybrid 
sources of substantive rules, Table 1 presents the rates at which disputants have 
selected national law rather than other sources in ICC arbitrations between 2003 
and 2008.48  The data shows that national law is the most widely used source of 
substantive rules in ICC arbitrations.  In approximately eighty percent of ICC 
arbitrations between 2003 and 2008, the parties specifically selected national law, 
and in only approximately one to three percent of ICC arbitrations did the parties 
select other sources.49  These figures suggest that the substantive rules applied in 
transnational commercial arbitration are usually drawn from public rather than 
private or hybrid sources.  Similar data would have to be collected for non-ICC 
arbitrations in order to reach more certain conclusions.50 
 
                                                 
45 In practice, the award may be mixed, with some elements favoring the claimant, and others 
favoring the respondent.  Thus, there will not necessarily be clear winners and losers. 
46 See http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=84219 (last accessed August 27, 2010).  
47 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 1994, viii. 
48 The source of my data is the annual statistical reports of the ICC contained in the ICC’s 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin.  See Drahozal 2009, 1039, Table 2 (compiling 2003-
2007 data); ICC 2009, 12 (2008 data). 
49 When the disputants fail to specify the applicable substantive law, the arbitrator ordinarily will 
do so.  See Blackaby and Partasides 2009, 230f. 
50 Drahozal 2009, 1039. 
14
Business and Politics, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 10
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art10
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1324
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2034561
 
Table 1 
Source of Substantive Rules Selected by the Parties in ICC Arbitrations 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
National 
Law 80.4% 79.1% 79.3% 82.7% 79.3% 84.0%
Other 
Source 1.2% 1.3% 1.7% 2.0% 0.5% 3.0%
No 
Selection 18.3% 19.6% 19.0% 15.3% 20.2% 13.2%
Source: Annual Statistical Reports of the ICC, from International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 
var. years. 
 
Other studies also suggest that the use of private sources of substantive 
rules is relatively infrequent.51  It appears that a principal reason why 
transnational commercial actors avoid these sources is that they tend to consider 
them too vague to provide meaningful behavioral guidance.52  As one expert 
practitioner of transnational commercial arbitration explains: 
 
There is much academic debate, but little judicial authority, about 
what [non-national choice-of-law clauses] mean, and there are 
doubts [about] how widely they are enforceable . . . . Save where 
there is some powerful countervailing reason, business enterprises 
should not expose themselves to the uncertainties or expenses that 
participation in this scholastic debate could entail.53 
 
                                                 
51 E.g. Dasser 2008, 131 (finding a total of only 79 cases in which a non-national legal standard 
was applied in arbitration, 32 of which also involved application of a national law); Drahozal 
2005, 540 (finding that 26.7%, or four of fifteen, international joint venture agreements publicly 
filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission between 1993 and 1996 
contained arbitration clauses referring to either “international legal principles and practices” or 
“general international commercial practices”).  Nevertheless, one study suggests that there is at 
least fairly widespread awareness of the use of private and hybrid sources of substantive law in 
transnational commercial arbitration.  E.g. Berger et al 2001, 96, 104 (survey study of in-house 
counsels, attorneys, arbitrators and other persons working in the field of international business law 
finding that 42% of respondents, of which a disproportionate number were Swiss or German, were 
aware of the use of non-state law in transnational commercial arbitration). 
52 Drahozal 2008, 671. 
53 Born 2006, 124. 
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Even if the rules applied in transnational commercial arbitration have 
primarily public sources, they are privately determined insofar as the disputants 
themselves (or, in some cases, the arbitrators) decide which rules will govern.  
Here, again, private-public interaction plays an important role in transnational 
commercial arbitration.54 
In summary, states play a leading role in providing the foundations for the 
transnational commercial arbitration system.  For their part, private actors play a 
leading role in determining the rules governing particular arbitral proceedings.  In 
both areas of rule-making, there is substantial private-public interaction. 
4. Enforcement in Transnational Commercial Arbitration 
The principal enforcement problems in transnational commercial arbitration 
involve ex ante arbitration clauses and arbitral awards.  Parties often include an 
arbitration clause in their transnational contracts.  Their decision to do so is a 
private choice, and may be based on a mutual belief that arbitration would be 
preferable to litigation in the event of a dispute.  Alternatively, the arbitration 
clause may have resulted from bargaining: the parties may disagree about the 
desirability of arbitration, but the party opposing arbitration may accept the 
arbitration clause in exchange for concessions from the party preferring 
arbitration.  In this sense, transnational actors’ “forum shopping” decisions are 
often a result of bargaining rather than simple rational choice. 
In either case, after a dispute arises or becomes likely, a party may 
conclude that it will be more likely to win (or likely to win more or lose less) in 
litigation than in arbitration.  For example, a claimant may conclude ex post that it 
is more likely to win if it is able to present its case to a jury, or if it is able to add 
claims against additional parties that are not bound by the arbitration clause—all 
of which generally is possible in litigation but not arbitration.  Such ex post 
assessments not only reduce the likelihood of ex post agreement to submit 
disputes to arbitration, but also increase the likelihood that a party will pursue 
litigation even if there is an ex ante arbitration clause.  For example, the party 
may argue that the arbitration clause is invalid or does not cover the type of 
dispute that has arisen.55 
Even if both parties follow their arbitration agreement and refrain from 
litigation, and the arbitrator issues an award in favor of the claimant and against 
the respondent, the respondent may fail to comply with the award.  For example, 
                                                 
54 O’Hara and Ribstein (2009) usefully describe the interactions between states that supply legal 
rules and private actors that choose them as a “law market.” 
55 Bermann 2003, 374. 
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the arbitrator may issue an award requiring the respondent to make a monetary 
payment to the claimant, but the respondent may refuse to pay. 
A combination of private and public processes mitigates enforcement 
problems like these.  For example, private enforcement of arbitration agreements 
and arbitral awards using reputational sanctions can enhance rule-following in 
transnational commercial arbitration.56  The logic is as follows: If an actor’s 
reputation for keeping its commitments is good, that reputation will increase the 
actor’s opportunities for entering profitable transactions with other actors who are 
aware of that reputation.  If the reputation is bad, it will decrease those 
opportunities.  Therefore, an actor’s reputation for keeping its commitments is a 
valuable asset.  The actor has an incentive to keep its commitments—including 
agreements to arbitrate and abide by arbitral awards—because noncompliance 
will harm that reputation.57  Insofar as an actor desires to enter arbitration 
agreements in the future and avoid litigation, that actor will have a particularly 
strong incentive to foster a good reputation for complying with arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards.58 
However, reputational sanctions are likely to be effective only under 
certain conditions.  For example, there must be a mechanism for disseminating 
information about parties’ behavior—information is, after all, the link between 
behavior and reputation.59  If A breaches an agreement to arbitrate with B, or 
refuses to comply with the resulting arbitral award, B obviously has knowledge of 
this, but absent a broader information-dissemination mechanism, other actors do 
not necessarily have this knowledge, potentially leaving A’s general reputation 
unharmed.60  One important value associated with arbitration, and often required 
by the disputants’ agreement—confidentiality—makes it particularly challenging 
to satisfy the information requirement with respect to compliance with arbitral 
awards.  Confidentiality aside, as the size of a community increases, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for any given actor to keep track of the conduct and 
reputations of others.  For these reasons, private enforcement is most likely to 
                                                 
56 Benson 1998, 95; Stone Sweet 2002, 325. 
57 Shepsle 1986, 71. 
58 Private enforcement based on reputational sanctions likely plays an especially important role in 
enhancing rule-following by arbitrators.  After all, arbitrators depend on disputants for 
employment, and disputants are unlikely to hire arbitrators with reputations for partiality, 
inefficiency, or infidelity to the rules set by the disputants. 
59 See Stone Sweet 2002, 325 (“This solution, of course, depends entirely on the organization of 
information and monitoring capacities, a collective good that, given the myriad costs involved, 
may or may not be generated by the traders themselves.”). 
60 See Guzman 2002, 1862f (“The extent to which a violation is known by the relevant players 
affects the reputational consequences of the violation.  Obviously, if a violation takes place, but no 
other state has knowledge of it, there is no reputational loss. The reputational consequences will 
also be less if only a small number of countries know of the violation.”). 
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play a significant role in rule-following in relatively small, well-defined, and 
enduring communities, in which the parties are able to monitor each other and are 
likely to have repeated interactions.  The implication is that the transnational 
commercial arbitration system—which operates at a global scale—probably 
cannot rely primarily on reputational sanctions to mitigate enforcement problems. 
Enforcement problems in transnational commercial arbitration have also 
been addressed by domestic courts.  They help solve these problems both by 
enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards in particular cases, and by 
discouraging noncompliance in the first place by signaling to transnational 
commercial actors that judicial enforcement is likely.  First, when one party to an 
arbitration agreement fails to abide by that agreement, the other party can seek 
judicial enforcement of the agreement.61  And when a party against whom an 
arbitral award has been issued fails to comply with that award, the other party can 
seek judicial enforcement of that award.  As discussed above, states have 
provided the foundations for judicial enforcement through international and 
domestic law.  However, judicial enforcement is privately triggered in the sense 
that it depends on a request from one of the disputants. 
In addition, domestic courts can support the rules governing transnational 
commercial arbitration by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements or arbitral 
awards that are inconsistent with those rules.  For example, they can support the 
rule that arbitration requires the consent of the disputants by refusing to enforce 
arbitration agreements that are null and void as the result of fraud.62  Similarly, 
they can support the rule that disputants must have notice of arbitral proceedings 
and an opportunity to present their cases by refusing to enforce awards that result 
from proceedings in which a disputant received no such notice or had no such 
opportunity.63  And they can support the rule that arbitrators shall not exceed the 
scope of authority granted to them by the disputants and permitted by law by 
refusing to enforce awards that exceed that scope.64 
                                                 
61 Domestic courts can use a variety of methods to enforce an arbitration agreement, including an 
order compelling arbitration, an order dismissing or staying litigation of disputes that are covered 
by an arbitration agreement, or an “anti-suit injunction” prohibiting a party from filing or 
proceeding with litigation of such a dispute in a foreign court.  For a detailed analysis of the 
various methods used by domestic courts to enforce transnational commercial arbitration 
agreements, see Born 2009, chap. 7. 
62 See the exception to enforcement in Article II(3) (“unless [the court] finds that the [arbitration 
agreement] is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”). 
63 See the exception to enforcement in Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention (“The party 
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case.”) 
64 Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 314f, 598.  See, for example, the exception to enforcement in 
Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention (“The award deals with a difference not 
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains 
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration . . . .”). 
18
Business and Politics, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 10
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art10
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1324
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2034561
 
Empirical evidence suggests that domestic courts play a significant role in 
the enforcement of awards following transnational commercial arbitration.  For 
example, a survey on the post-award experience of claimants in 205 transnational 
commercial arbitrations in the AAA between 1999 and 2002 reveals considerable 
levels of post-award judicial involvement.  In 100 cases, the claimant prevailed 
and the award debtor eventually complied fully or partially with the award.65  Of 
those one hundred cases, there was judicial confirmation of the award in sixty-
eight cases and judicial enforcement in twelve cases.66  Even then, full 
compliance was the result in only seventy-four of the one hundred cases, while 
there was partial compliance in four cases and the parties renegotiated the award 
in twenty-two cases.  Of the remaining 105 cases, the award debtor failed to 
comply in thirty-five cases; a court vacated the award in one case; fifty-one cases 
were still pending in a court action; and the claimant lost in eighteen cases.67  A 
more recent study estimates that the U.S. federal district courts have been called 
upon hundreds of times to enforce arbitral awards covered by the New York 
Convention.68 
Second, domestic courts mitigate enforcement problems by signaling to 
transnational commercial actors that they are likely to enforce arbitration 
agreements, arbitral awards, and the rules governing the transnational commercial 
arbitration system.69  Other things being equal, the higher the perceived 
probability of judicial enforcement, the higher the probability that transnational 
actors will comply before actual judicial enforcement is necessary.  After all, as 
the probability of judicial enforcement increases, the willingness of a party to 
incur the costs needed to resist enforcement should decrease.70  This perceived 
probability is largely a function of the prior published enforcement decisions of 
                                                 
65 Naimark & Keer 2005, 271. 
66 Naimark & Keer 2005, 271. 
67 Naimark & Keer 2005, 271.  As the authors note: “A total of 35 cases reported non-compliance 
with the award.  Fifty-one cases were unresolved at the time of the survey and were pending in a 
court action of some type.  Those 51 cases tended to be the most recently awarded matters and had 
not, therefore, sufficiently ‘ripened’ to demonstrate a final result.  While we have no further data 
on the final outcomes of those 51 cases it seems likely that they will eventually show the same 
patterns of post-award results as the other 154 cases [i.e. compliance in 118 cases, non-compliance 
in 35 cases, award vacated in 1 case].”  Naimark & Keer 2005, 271. 
68 Whytock 2008b, 63-67. 
69 See Drahozal 2009, 1040 (“While it appears that most international arbitration awards are 
complied with voluntarily, the available empirical evidence suggests that public courts nonetheless 
play an important role in the process.”); Whytock 2008a, 470 (“Transnational [arbitration] to an 
important extent . . . relies on domestic courts for enforcement.”). 
70 This is a simple extension of the basic economic model of the decision to litigate.  According to 
that model, a plaintiff will only file a claim if the expected value of the claim (which equals the 
probability that the plaintiff will win (p) times the amount of recovery if it wins (w)), less the costs 
of suit, is greater than zero.  The so-called “filing condition” is thus (p*w)-c>0.  Bone 2003, 34. 
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domestic courts.  The higher the rate of enforcement in those decisions, the higher 
the perceived probability of future enforcement.  Thus, perhaps even more 
important than judicial enforcement in particular cases is the expectation of 
judicial enforcement in potential future cases.  A disputant’s rule-following 
behavior thus depends significantly on the anticipated behavior of domestic 
courts—namely, the disputant’s expectations about whether a domestic court will 
enforce an arbitration agreement or arbitral award if the disputant fails to comply 
with it.  This impact of domestic court decisions on the behavior of transnational 
actors beyond the parties to particular disputes is an example of the “transnational 
shadow of the law.”71 
To shed empirical light on judicial signaling regarding the enforcement of 
arbitral awards, I created a dataset of all U.S. federal district court decisions 
between 1970 and 2008 published in the Westlaw database involving enforcement 
of arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention.72  I coded each decision 
based on whether it was a decision to enforce the arbitral award in full or not.  If 
the decision was to enforce in full, the decision was coded as “yes”; otherwise, the 
decision was coded as “no.”73 
 
Table 2 
Enforcement Rates of Arbitral Awards Covered by the New York 
Convention  
Award Fully Enforced? Number of Decisions Percentage of Decisions 
Yes 112 77.2% 
No 33 22.8% 
Total 145 100.0% 
Note: This table presents the rate at which the U.S. federal district courts have fully enforced 




                                                 
71 Whytock 2009, 29f. 
72 The search was conducted on October 10, 2008.  For details regarding the dataset, see Whytock 
2008b, 57f. 
73 Occasionally, awards are partially enforced or enforcement decisions are stayed pending the 
outcome of parallel foreign proceedings to vacate or set aside an award.  I coded these decisions as 
“no,” indicating that there was not full enforcement.  For coding details, see Whytock 2008b, 72f. 
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The results, presented in Table 2, show that between 1970 and 2008, the 
U.S. federal district courts have fully enforced arbitral awards covered by the 
New York Convention at an estimated rate of 77.2 percent in their published 
decisions.74  The signal that appears is that attempts to resist enforcement are 
more likely than not to fail.  It is more by creating these expectations than by 
providing enforcement in particular cases that domestic courts support the 
transnational commercial arbitration system.75 
At the same time, my findings suggest that the U.S. district courts are also 
sending the signal that they do not automatically enforce arbitral awards, but are 
instead willing to perform a monitoring role, as the New York Convention allows 
them to do, to evaluate whether particular arbitral proceedings are consistent with 
minimal due process standards and public policy.76  This willingness may not 
only enhance the perceived legitimacy of the transnational commercial arbitration 
system, but also help address the concerns of some practitioners about the lack of 
a right of appeal in arbitration.77 
By preventing domestic courts from performing their monitoring role in 
the transnational commercial arbitration system, states risk eroding the system’s 
legitimacy.  For example, a law adopted by Belgium in 1985 barred review of 
arbitral awards by Belgian courts in arbitrations not involving Belgian citizens or 
businesses located in Belgium.  As Moses explains: “It was believed at the time 
that this would increase the number of arbitrations in Belgium.  In fact, however, 
the law had the opposite effect.  Businesses were not drawn to a system with no 
possible court review.  It appeared instead that businesses were avoiding Belgium 
                                                 
74 In 3.5% of published decisions, the U.S. district courts either partially enforced the award or 
stayed enforcement proceedings.  Whytock 2008b, 72f.  Based on the theory that judges are less 
likely to publish mundane decisions and the assumption that judges view enforcement of arbitral 
awards to be the norm, it is possible that the overall enforcement rate, including in unpublished 
decisions, is higher than in published decisions.  See Drahozal and Naimark 2005, 264. 
75 Whytock 2008a, 470f. 
76 See e.g. New York Convention, Article V(1)(a) (“Recognition and enforcement of the award 
may be refused . . . [if] . . . [t]he party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper 
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case . . . .”), Article V(1)(d) (allowing refusal to recognize or enforce an 
arbitral award when “the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place”), and Article V(2)(b) (“Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
may . . . be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought finds that [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of that country.”). 
77 Born (2006, 6) summarizes the tradeoff: “Dispensing with appellate review reduces both 
litigation costs and delays.  On the other hand, it also means that wildly eccentric, or simply 
wrong, arbitral decisions cannot be corrected.”).  Callahan (2006, 31, 49) has found that a major 
reason for preferring litigation over arbitration is the availability of appellate review in litigation. 
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as a place of arbitration.”78  Belgium therefore amended the law in 1998, allowing 
parties to opt out of judicial review, but no longer barring such review.79 
In summary, both private actors and state actors help mitigate enforcement 
problems in the transnational commercial arbitration system.  Private actors do so 
by applying reputational sanctions.  States, through their domestic courts, do so 
by enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards in particular disputes, and 
fostering expectations of enforcement in potential future disputes. 
5. Conclusion 
Although global governance scholars have tended to treat the transnational 
commercial arbitration system as a private form of global governance, this article 
has shed light on the role of the state in that system.  Specifically, I have argued 
that both rule-making and enforcement in the system depend largely on 
interactions between private and public actors.  Therefore, I suggest that scholars 
treat the transnational commercial arbitration system as a mixed private-public 
form of governance and devote more effort to understanding private-public 
interaction in the system. 
An improved understanding of private-public interaction in transnational 
commercial arbitration will help scholars contribute more effectively to the 
solution of difficult normative problems and theoretical puzzles.  Normatively, the 
question of private-public interaction goes to the heart of hopes and fears about 
the transnational commercial arbitration system.  On the one hand, scholars have 
noted that by reducing the reach of state control over transnational business, the 
system can decrease transaction costs and increase private autonomy in 
transnational commercial relations.80  On the other hand, scholars have expressed 
concern that by freeing transnational business actors from state-based legal 
regulation, the system may unduly prioritize facilitation of transnational business 
transactions over other objectives of public policy such as distributive justice and 
the regulation of the negative externalities of transnational business activity.81  
But the extent to which these hopes and fears reflect reality depends largely on the 
nature and extent of state involvement in the transnational commercial arbitration 
system.  Thus, by improving our understanding of private-public interaction in 
                                                 
78 Moses 2008, 57. 
79 Moses 2008, 57. 
80 See, e.g., Mattli 2001, 921; Stone Sweet 2006, 627. 
81 See, e.g., Cutler 2003, 226.  As Wai (2002, 212, 231) puts it in an important law review article, 
by contributing to “the transnational liftoff of international business transactions from national 
regulatory oversight,” the transnational commercial arbitration system may undermine 
“worthwhile policy objectives such as distributive justice, democratic political governance, or 
effective transnational regulation.” 
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transnational commercial arbitration, we can improve our understanding of both 
its promises and perils. 
A better understanding of private-public interaction is also necessary to 
solve one of the central puzzles of the transnational commercial arbitration 
system: What explains state support for that system?  Broad support was not 
inevitable.  States could have instead attempted to preserve transnational litigation 
in domestic courts as the dominant method of transnational commercial dispute 
resolution and a leading instrument of state governance of transnational 
commercial activity.  From a traditional state-focused perspective on world 
politics, this alternative would have seemed most likely.  Why would states 
encourage a system of global governance in which they substantially share power 
with private actors?  One theory emphasizes private political pressure on states to 
support arbitration as a transnational dispute resolution alternative to litigation,82 
while another emphasizes economic competition among states to attract 
transnational arbitration business.83  Central to both accounts are interactions 
between private and public actors.  By exploiting cross-national and temporal 
variation in states’ adoption of the various domestic and international legal 
instruments that support the transnational commercial arbitration system, and with 
careful historical process tracing, scholars can begin refining and empirically 
testing these theories. 
Finally, while my primary goal in this article is to nudge global 
governance scholarship on transnational commercial arbitration in a direction that 
more strongly focuses on private-public interaction, this article also has 
implications for the study of global governance more generally.  Descriptively, 
the article raises the possibility that there may not be purely private (or, for that 
matter, purely public) forms of global governance.  Analytically, even though it is 
important to understand the distinct roles of private and public actors in global 
governance, the article raises doubts about the desirability of a sharp conceptual 
distinction between private and public forms of global governance.  Scholars who 
insist too strongly on this distinction run the risk of obscuring important 
interactions between private and public actors.  Theoretically, this article implies 
that accounts of global governance processes—including rule-making and 
enforcement processes—will remain incomplete if they lack an account of how 
private and public actors interact in those processes. 
 
                                                 
82 E.g. Born 2009, 49f.; Dezalay & Garth 1996, 43f. 
83 O’Hara & Ribstein 2009, 98-101. 
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Appendix: List of Acronyms 
AAA: American Arbitration Association 
ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council 
FAA: U.S. Federal Arbitration Act 
ICC: International Chamber of Commerce 
ICDR: International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the American 
Arbitration Association 
LCIA: London Court of International Arbitration 
UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
UNIDROIT: International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
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